

CREATION AND NOVELTY*

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Since I am a philosopher by training (and not a theologian), the observations I will make about the notion of creation will be essentially prolegomenal in character, that is to say, preliminary, prior to actual theological work. In offering remarks of a prolegomenal variety, I am of course assigning a certain priority to philosophical issues vis-a-vis theological work.

Much of a philosopher's work consists in setting aside terminological confusions. And so I shall begin by reminding you that the term "creation," or perhaps "the creation," is used regularly in two separate, but overlapping, senses. Sometimes the entity, i.e., the world or universe which God has made, is meant, whereas on other occasions what is referred to is the *process* by which this world came to be. When the former meaning is intended, the definite article is usually affixed to the word creation. Many of us like to wax eloquent about "the creation" and its wonders.

Now I have nothing against enthusiastic talk about the creation and its marvels, but I would like to point out that it does not necessarily have anything to do with the Christian doctrine of creation as I shall be discussing it. The sort of thing we enjoy saying about "the creation," which we then declare to be good, beautiful, perfect, etc., is often linked in our hearts with proper concern for the environment and ecological issues. We say that we wish people truly loved the creation, realized how intricate it is, and so forth. In making such points we could equally well appeal to the Chinese philosophical tradition known as Taoism, for it has a similar view of the balanced interrelatedness of all things that together make up the world in which we live. In pointing out this similarity, of course, I do not mean to criticize Taoism

and its view of nature (to use a more theologically neutral term). What we should say about Taoism in this context, rather, is that it lacks something, namely, a proper awareness of the divine origin and supporting ground of creation or nature.

My point is that the free use of the term creation by people who often do not believe in creation in any strict Biblical sense at all can easily mislead us. One can hold Taoist-like opinions about balance in nature and still cling to the view that the world is eternal, a view that can today be expressed in the thesis that it makes no sense to seek a beginning for the world. Thus, to talk about "the creation" and to express appreciation and concern for it is not yet to get anywhere near the startling uniqueness of the Biblical notion of creation.

With this terminological clarification behind us, we can look at an interesting statement by the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset, who once declared: "Compared with the entire Greek system of ideas, the idea of revelation, like the idea of creation, is an absolute novelty."¹ One of the main points I want to get across is that the Christian notion of creation is frequently watered down, regularized, evened-out, so that the absolute novelty which Ortega spotted (his insight is all the keener when we bear in mind that he was not a Christian thinker) evaporates, or ceases to function in our theology.

One more appeal to a philosopher is needed at this point. Ortega's quotation seems to open up a gulf between the Biblical tradition of thought and the Greek tradition, which is of course the fountain and pillar (two separate comparisons here to make an important point) of the tradition we call Western philosophy. Are these two traditions so different in essential respects? And is Greek philosophy, with its long line of descendants in subsequent ages of philosophy's history, fundamentally inhospitable to Biblical teaching? Many of the early Church fathers answered this question--even more in their actual practice than in their writings--with a resounding no. The story of much early Christian thought--indeed, Christian theology--is that of a mixture,

and even fusion, of these two traditions. Whence, then, this almost uncharitable judgment on the part of Ortega?

I shall not seek to defend it by pointing to Ortega's own psyche or intellectual development. In support of it I will instead draw your attention to the work of a little known Russian existentialist thinker who stands in the Jewish tradition--Lev Shestov (1866-1938), who offers us a breath-taking perspective on the history of philosophy, a perspective that links up the birth of philosophy with the manifestation of unbelief in the Garden of Eden. Shestov writes:

. . .Hegel was not at all embarrassed to say that the serpent had spoken the truth to the first man and that the fruits of the tree of knowledge became the source of philosophy for all time. If we ask on what side truth is, and if we admit in advance that our reason is called to pronounce the final judgment in the argument between God and the serpent, no doubt is possible: it is the serpent who triumphs.

Shestov draws a contrast between "that" and "why," between the opaque and the transparent, between revelation and self-evident truth. The repudiation of revelation in favor of self-evident truth, which we see in the history of philosophy, is also to be found in the Garden of Eden. Shestov observes:

. . .man, seduced by the serpent, was not content with this knowledge: the 'that' (*hoti*) did not suffice for him; he desired the 'why' (*dioti*); the 'that' irritated him just as it irritated Kant. His reason aspired avidly to universal and necessary judgments; he could not feel satisfied as long as he had not succeeded in transforming the truth that was 'revealed' and situated above both the universal and the necessary into a self-evident truth. . . .

What the philosopher and the man of unbelief have in common is that they find the notion of faith and revelation as something to be accepted in a spirit of trust deeply offensive. The first man, says Shestov, ". . .also wished 'to know,' not 'to believe'; he saw in faith a kind of diminution, an

injury to his human dignity, and he was certain of this when the serpent told him that after he had eaten of the fruits of the forbidden tree he would become like God--knowing."²

Shestov was calling for a recognition of the notion of "created truth." And he was convinced that the philosophical tradition, with its roots in Greek thought, could not agree to such a thing. The idea of philosophy, as interpreted by Shestov, is, in brief, the exclusion of all novelty in the name of the eternal necessity of truth. There can be no creation because thought permits no novelty: the order of things is an eternal order of necessity. The mind of man, seduced by the root human sin of pride, does not allow God to create, to bring forth something radically new.

II

I must dwell a little longer on philosophy and its relation to Christian theology. Most of us are accustomed to making a distinction between philosophy and science. We think of the latter as concerned with the discovery of new truths. This is a fair and fruitful way to conceive of the difference between the two types of inquiry, even if it is indeed the case that many major intellectual figures have functioned as both philosophers and scientists. (Today this is rather unusual: what one does see on occasion, however, is that a scientist turns to philosophy in later years, e.g., Michael Polanyi).

What is the philosopher up to, then? One way to think of his task is to say that he assimilates, organizes and arranges the knowledge assembled by a larger human community of inquiry, without himself making major discoveries. This is certainly a fruitful way to understand the work of Aristotle, who is universally recognized as one of the greatest of all philosophers. When we review the titles of his writings, it turns out that they include a number of subjects that we would normally place outside philosophy, e.g., *Politics*, *Poetics*. Aristotle was in the business of synthesizing and interrelating; the result of his work was a virtual encyclopedia of knowledge. We see a similar pattern in Hegel, who looked back to Aristotle as a model for his own work as a philosopher. Hegel even went so far as to write what he

called an *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. When one reads in this monumental work, which is often published in fragmentary editions, such as the book known in English as *Philosophy of Mind*, one sees that it deals with all sorts of subjects, including many that are not normally regarded as part of philosophy under any strict definition.

There is one particularly interesting feature of this philosophical project that I would like to draw to your attention, namely, that it presupposes what one might call the continuity postulate. In other words, philosophers in the tradition of Aristotle and Hegel are convinced that all of human knowledge is potentially--or even essentially--of one piece. If this is indeed so, it must be possible for all of it to be synthesized into a single system. (Hegel's notion of absolute knowledge is the strongest articulation of such a principle which the history of philosophy has ever witnessed.) This postulate, I am convinced, has sneaked into Christian consciousness as well. Its consequence for our topic, creation, is that whatever we say about creation must be continuous with the rest of our knowledge. In other words, if we follow Aristotle and Hegel, we will assume that it must be possible to make our doctrine of creation part of the encyclopedia of Christian knowledge. Without thinking much about it, we decide that it can be assimilated and made part of the system.

But is it really continuous? And should we stress continuity as a structuring principle in Christian thought? As we consider this question, we should bear in mind that one of the fundamental principles of the liberal mind in theology is this same principle of continuity. Kenneth Cauthen, an astute student of liberal thought, explains the importance of this principle in liberal thought in the following terms:

This theme manifests itself in every area of thought and permeates all liberal theology. There is practically no end to its application. It reduces the distinction between animals and men, men and God, nature and God, reason and revelation, Christ and other men, Christianity and other religions, nature and grace, the saved and the lost, justification and sanctification, Christianity and culture,

the church and the world, the sacred and the secular, the individual and society, life here and hereafter, heaven and hell, the natural and the supernatural, the human and divine natures of Christ, etc.³

What we can discern from this analysis is that there is an inner connection between the philosophical tradition and liberalism in theology. I must confess that I sometimes use the term "theology" in a somewhat pejorative way in my lectures. I do so not to stir up opposition to theology as such but to challenge students to think carefully about theology's roots in our Western intellectual heritage. What I then mean by the term is the body of thought that results when intellectuals who have given their hearts to the philosophical tradition get hold of some ideas in the Bible and try to regularize and systematize them, following out the consequences of the principle of continuity.

To penetrate further into the ramifications of the principle of continuity, we need to look briefly at two other philosophers--Descartes and Kant. The theme in the philosophical development that took place in the era almost two centuries long which philosophers speak of as the "modern period" (Descartes was born in 1596, and Kant died in 1804), is the growing centrality of the subject or knower. The seeds of what emerged as transcendental philosophy in Kant were clearly present in Descartes' famous turn to the subject. In other words, what Descartes had begun, Kant brought to a remarkable conclusion.

In terms of my analysis, we could say that the principle of continuity gets transcendental standing through the work which Kant capped off. All of knowledge forms a system; it is of one piece. Descartes, of course, was fully committed to this thesis, as his famous comparison of our knowledge to a tree indicates. He writes: "Thus philosophy as a whole is like a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches, which issue from this trunk, are all the other sciences."⁴ Kant, bringing this tradition to a conclusion in the conception of science sketched out in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, even inaugurates another tradition in his moral philosophy and philosophy of religion, when he

pushes all "religious knowledge" into the category of belief. But that later development in Kantian philosophy, interesting as it is in itself, will not concern me at this juncture.

Important for our purposes is the Kantian resolution of the Cartesian split between transcendental priority and ontological priority. For Descartes the human subject came first in the order of knowing: the *Meditations* start with the knowing subject and reach God further down the line via an ontological argument. Yet, in and through all of this, Descartes still held to an essentially orthodox account of God and creation: ontologically speaking, God comes first, and all of created reality is dependent upon him moment by moment. In Kant, of course, this separation is overcome, and the Cartesian ontology in which all things depend on God vanishes. Human knowledge is at this point thoroughly representational (in brief: contained in, and limited to, consciousness). Kant says of it: "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations. . . ." ⁵

Because pretentious transcendental language has largely fallen away in twentieth-century philosophy (although it is still to be found in Husserl and even in Heidegger), all of this might seem far-fetched. I would maintain, however, that the idea of relating all knowledge to the human subject as the condition and principle for its unity and organization is still very much with us. William James, in particular, was keenly aware that a secularized culture had to replace God, as the traditional absolute knower, with a human all-knower, or perhaps a community of knowers. He observes that empiricism, by which he means the thinking that has largely displaced the idealistic metaphysics that felt it could still appeal to "the Absolute,"

. . . is satisfied with the type of noetic unity that is humanly familiar. Everything gets known by *some* knower along with something else; but the knowers may in the end be irreducibly many, and the greatest knower of them all may not yet know the whole of everything, or even know what he does know at one single stroke--he may be liable to forget.⁶

The philosophical suggestions of James have not carried the day in our time: the amount of discontinuity in our knowledge which he was prepared to accept is simply too much for many of our contemporaries to swallow. They are determined that all knowledge must somehow be understood as *my* knowledge, and that therefore it must all be of a single piece. Hence, if we are to have a doctrine of beginnings, of origins, it must be related to me and my concerns in the present; it must be *constituted* (to use a high-flown but still relevant term drawn from the phenomenological tradition) by contemporary practical interests. It cannot be a sheer given that comes to me as an absolute novelty--an opaque "that" as opposed to a transparent "why," to hark back to the terminology of Shestov. Ontology in the old-fashioned sense of ascertaining and listing what is there (including man's place in the larger web of existence) is hardly in evidence any longer among philosophers.

III

That some relation to the subject who knows and acts in the present is constitutive for human awareness and consciousness can perhaps be demonstrated most easily in philosophy of history (which is my own area of academic specialization). Understanding, the mode of knowledge appropriate to the historical world and, more broadly, to social and cultural questions, turns out on close inspection to have a backward-looking or retrospective character in that it constructs--or even continuously reconstructs--the past from the standpoint of the present and its existential needs and interests. The retrospective character of understanding was clearly grasped by the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), who maintained: "One would first have to await the end of history in order to possess all the material necessary to determine its meaning."⁷

To make such an admission about the character of historical consciousness is not to yield to modern philosophy and its transcendental orientation but to recognize the essential structure of historical thought. (It is important to set off historical thought from other modes of knowledge, of which I

am convinced there are many). The awareness that historical thought has a retrospective character and is always shaped by the interests and existential needs of the present has the effect of relativizing our historical certainties. It shows us that one cannot simply look into the past, so to speak, in order to see and register what's there, the way a photographic plate is thought to record (without subjective or artistic input) what it finds before itself. The past, in any case, is not just there to be inspected. As a Christian philosopher of history, I am convinced that a recognition of the subject-centeredness of historical awareness can help us see limits in human knowledge more broadly. The theme of my own work in this area is that there are sources of correction of which the historical knower must avail himself if he is not to be misled constantly. Thus a kind of objectivity is still possible, I believe. What is needed, in short, is what some thinkers have called a "critique" (critical investigation of character and limits) of "historical reason" (I would prefer to call it historical consciousness).

A proper awareness of reproductivity as a constitutive principle in much human knowledge can help us especially, I am convinced, in coming to grips with the body of literature we call evolutionism. I believe that evolutionism is best understood as a narrative that leads to the hero or protagonist, namely, man as we know him in our time. What I find amusing about such writing is that the same scientists who make such an effort to eliminate all purposiveness and teleology from scientific writing allow it to dominate when the evolutionistic narrative is constructed. All the entities--or should I say characters?--we encounter along the way seem to have their sights set on the perfections of twentieth-century homo sapiens. The things they do are necessary in order that *we* might one day walk on the stage of human history. We are treated to the sight of endless organisms and creatures, seemingly lacking in intelligence, determined to pass on their "genes." Oddly enough, man himself didn't know what genes were until comparatively recently; yet those organisms living millions of years ago were positively eager to pass on their genes and play their role in the glorious process of evolution that led up to us.

What is evolutionism, then? A reconstruction of the distant past on the basis of "facts" (remember that the alleged facts are really only bits of non-organic matter existing in the present) and materials within a speculative narrative framework. It has nothing to do with science in any strict and worthy sense of the term. The more one studies literature--especially the branch that concerns itself with the constitutive principles of narration--the more one comes to recognize evolutionism for what it really is, namely, the myth which many people in our society choose to live by. Creationists are right to challenge its official endorsement in the curricula of public schools.

IV

After this somewhat lengthy excursus into philosophical questions, I come at last not to theology but to what I would more modestly call advice to theology and theologians. By this point the main thrust of my advice should be obvious: stay away from the great systematization and regularization of human knowledge. I do not believe that theology should apply for permission to be included as part of the "encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences."

Some might wish to argue that my advice to theology sins against the ideal of integrating faith and learning, an ideal and goal that has virtually official status by now in some of our Reformed colleges. Shouldn't there be a highway leading from theology to physics and biology, let us say, and another parallel road leading back, like a modern freeway?

My conviction is that the road that gets one from theology to biology should not be too broad and inviting. I am inclined instead to view the various disciplines and intellectual traditions that are represented in the curriculum of a Christian college as properly *competing* with one another to some extent, and thereby also relativizing one another. Even the staunchest proponents of the integration of faith and learning know that a science student glued to his microscope for too long can benefit from some exposure to art and poetry. Charles Darwin himself complained about losing his taste for poetry in later years and speculated that it might

have been due to too much concentration on scientific work:

. . . formerly Pictures gave me considerable, and music very great delight. But now for many years I cannot endure to read a line of poetry; I have tried lately to read Shakespeare and found it so intolerably dull that it nauseated me. I have also almost lost any taste for pictures or music. . . . My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections of fact, but why this should have caused the atrophy of that part of the brain alone, on which the higher tastes depend, I cannot conceive.⁸

The problem that arose in Darwin's life is the reason why our colleges take a liberal arts approach and even build in requirements that will keep students from getting too narrow and specialized. I believe a little competition (as in FDR's White House) can be healthy. It might even lead some disciplines or subdisciplines currently represented in our colleges into a well-deserved decline.

I recognize that the answer I have given to the question I raised above is somewhat sketchy: a fuller answer is available in my book *Public Knowledge and Christian Education* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1988), which focuses especially on the challenge of science in our Christian institutions. For this context I will say, in brief, that I propose to interpret the ideal of the integration of faith and learning in a non-Hegelian manner. (It should be noted, by the way, that there is a good deal of organicistic idealism in our current rhetoric about Christian higher education; think of Abraham Kuyper's heavy use of "organic" as contrasted with "mechanical").

Moreover, as regards the ideal of integrating faith and learning, please note that I have not said a word against it. "Learning is for serving" is the motto of Redeemer College, and that's essentially what I take the integration of faith and learning to be all about. We learn physics not to apply it in theology or to help us understand theology better but to serve God more effectively. Thus we should say: "Physics is for serving"--not "Physics is for theology." And, conversely,

when we study theology, it is not necessarily in the expectation that it will make better physicists out of us.

V

My second piece of advice to theology and theologians is embodied in my title: stress that creation involves novelty, something unexpected, indigestible, unassimilable. I do not claim that this is the whole meaning of the doctrine of creation (I will make some comments later about the notion of *creatio ex nihilo*), and I do not suggest that this emphasis can or should be central in the way passages about creation are dealt with in sermons. Remember that I am talking specifically about theology.

Perhaps we can here regard the notion of novelty as a translation, into positive language, of what I earlier called discontinuity. Ortega is right, I believe, in maintaining that the Biblical notion of creation runs directly contrary to untutored human expectations about the nature of reality. Creation is too novel a notion ever to fit neatly inside our intellectual systems, and it stands so utterly outside human experience that it cannot be regarded as part of our history or be properly woven into stories that have people as their protagonists.

My third piece of advice is that if you are sympathetic to what I have said so far, you cannot properly regard creation--as the Bible presents it--as a story. (I would argue instead that it is the backdrop to every story, that it sets the stage.) This may strike you as a strange claim because we have grown up with story Bibles that begin with "the creation story." But if it is genuinely a story, who is the protagonist? God, you answer. Perhaps so, but can we truly make God the protagonist? When God gets down to our level, doesn't he do so by incarnating himself as Jesus? Reread some of the accounts in the story Bibles. Do they really have a story-like character?

We also like to insist that the creation story is literally true. (We then mean that it is not to be interpreted as an allegory, as Augustine was inclined to do.) I agree that it is

no allegory, but I don't know quite how the category of literalness (which I understand to mean "in terms of ordinary experience") can apply here. It seems to me that the creation account (I prefer not to call it a story) is not to be understood literally at all. It is to be confessed and embraced while being understood only in a fragmentary way, for it transcends human comprehension.

My next piece of advice to theologians will be found less controversial, I'm sure. We should avoid any naturalizing of the creation account. The naturalizing approach (which plays into the hands of theological liberals who are determined, in accordance with the principle of continuity, to integrate theology, along with its doctrine of creation, into the larger body of knowledge that I have been calling the encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences) focuses on creation as a process and asks how it took place. Whereas I would answer that we don't know and have no way of finding out, the naturalizers insist that creation must be equivalent to the grand process that some scientists refer to as evolution. And so we posit a kind of cosmic evolution (which extends beyond the organic domain) and decree that the entire process (which in the context of theology we then call *theistic evolution*) is the work of God.

I will not take up any time reviewing the usual objections to theistic evolution. Instead I will proceed directly to what I find so interesting about it, namely, that it opens up the work of God to scientific scrutiny. "God moves in a mysterious way / His wonders to perform," we often sing (*Psalter Hymnal*, 461, 1957 edition). I would invite attention especially for the last stanza: "Blind unbelief is sure to err, / And scan His work in vain; / God is His own Interpreter, / And He will make it plain." We confess the mystery in worship and song, but when we undertake academic work we seem to think that the mystery needs to be dispelled--and can be dispelled. Thus I suggest that if we manage to resist the integration of physics and biology with theology, we will have an easier time resisting the blandishments of theistic evolution.

VI

I am now in a position to comment on the famous Latin phrase that so many of us associate with the doctrine of creation--*creatio ex nihilo*. It is true that the phrase and notion do not get referred to directly in the Bible, although there is a proof text of sorts in the Apocrypha: "I beseech you, my child, to look at the heaven and the earth and see everything that is in them, and recognize that God did not make them out of things that existed. Thus also mankind comes into being" (II Maccabees 7:28). The phrase is not in the Bible because the notion is essentially a refined piece of theological abstraction.

I have chosen to deal with this notion last rather than first because my lecture has been essentially a roundabout--and perhaps somewhat novel (I had to get that word in there)--way of explicating what is meant by this term. To say that God created the world out of nothing is to affirm that the process is utterly unlike anything we know. Theology abounds in comparisons, analogies, and metaphors. We invent them freely--sometimes too freely--to apply to the work of God, but *creatio ex nihilo* cuts certain of them off at the root.

One of our favorite analogies is building. A person in the building business can usually figure out, in inspecting a new building, what the major steps were in getting it up. He can see what sort of equipment was involved, in what order the various tradesmen had to do their work, and so forth. But there is no builder able to survey the handiwork of God and say: "Now I see how he did it. I can tell where he got his building supplies and what the major steps in the project were." God is the master builder who leaves no scaffolding behind. There is nothing in the creation--contrary to the theistic evolutionists--that can tell us how it all came to be out of nothing. In fact, the "*ex nihilo*" phrase can almost be viewed as piece of satire. We tend to be very conscious of what things are made of. So when we ask how God made the world and what materials he used, the answer comes back, almost as a rebuke: Out of nothing.

Also very important in this notion is its simplicity. Christian theology is intended to be lived, preached, confessed; therefore it must not be too complex. The doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* is highly abstract, and yet very simple. Even a child can say it, and can probably understand it about as much as any of us have understood it. The doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* cuts off, at the very root, any and all natural-theology discussions of how God does what he does in making the world. At the simplest level it says to us: "All you have to do is believe."

VII

A central notion in my discussion so far is that of "naturalizing": I have argued that the acts of God in creation must not be naturalized, brought into the scope of human investigation and inquiry, and reduced by being understood. This notion also has application in other areas of theology. Indeed, it can help us understand what theology is and why it cannot be integrated with psychology, for example, to the same extent that sociology can. (I trust you realize by now that I do not maintain that two such disciplines as psychology and sociology should not build roads back and forth and seek a high degree of interrelation; my concern here is simply to protect the independence and integrity of theology).

Another major topic we deal with in theology is faith. The creeds tell us that faith is a gift of the Holy Spirit. The Heidelberg Catechism asks simply: Whence comes this faith? The answer: "From the Holy Spirit" (Lord's Day 25). In the Canons of Dort we read that ". . .the secret recesses of the heart are unknown to us" (Article 15 of Chapter 3-4). The Belgic Confession takes up this theme in connection with the sacraments. Perhaps it has never occurred to you to ask whether the operation of God's Spirit through the sacraments is subject to scientific scrutiny. The Belgic Confession is quite definite on this point, speaking of the work of the Spirit as an "inward and invisible thing" (Article 33), and of "invisible grace" as accompanying the part of the sacrament that is visible (i.e., the water--see Article 34). In Article 35, which deals with the Lord's Supper, we read about a twofold

life, one "temporal" and the other "spiritual," and we are informed that the latter "is not common, but is peculiar to God's elect." When our Lord works in our hearts through the sacraments, ". . .the manner surpasses our understanding and cannot be comprehended by us, as the operations of the Holy Spirit are hidden and incomprehensible." Thus it might seem an interesting project to investigate faith from the standpoint of modern psychology, but our creeds are not at all hospitable to such an enterprise. In this sector of theology, too, we must be on guard against naturalizing, against the effort to integrate Christian credal teaching into some larger encyclopedic body of philosophical knowledge.

Now, there is much theological and psychological literature that tries to argue that such an enterprise is both possible and necessary. Faith, for such thinkers, is part of our psychical make-up. The generation and growth of faith can be studied, and in the literature on religious education we see all sorts of strategies whereby these things can be facilitated. I will refer only to the most prominent of the thinkers: James Fowler, the author of such works as *Stages of Faith* and *Becoming Adult, Becoming Christian*, who, of course, owes a good deal to the inspiration of Lawrence Kohlberg.

Fowler both interests and concerns me, not just because of the universalism that underlies his work as its real theological meaning, but even more because of his alluring suggestion that the life of faith and grace and sacrament can all come within the scope of science. The rise of interest in faith development (all such talk goes back to Fowler and Kohlberg) is a major dangerous trend in the Christian Reformed Church today, although it is not normally identified as such. The novelty theme needs to be used here as well, to stress the utter incomprehensibility and indispensability of what the Holy Spirit does.

*This address was delivered as part of the annual Mid-America Special Lecture Series in November, 1987.

ENDNOTES

1. *Man and Crisis*, trans. by Mildred Adams (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962) 164-165.
2. *Athens and Jerusalem*, trans. by Bernard Martin (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966) 280-282.
3. *The Impact of American Religious Liberalism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) 9.
4. See *Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, Vol. I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 211.
5. *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by N. K. Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968) B131, 152.
6. "Pragmatism", Lecture 4, in *Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press edition, 1978) 73.
7. See my book *Historical Understanding in the Thought of Wilhelm Dilthey* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980) 10.
8. "Autobiography," in Charles Darwin and Thomas Henry Huxley, *Autobiographies*, ed. by Gavin de Beer (London: Oxford University Press, 1974) 83-84.